Bloodless Coup

Woodward's "Plan of Attack"

Yes, others have read and discussed this. I get to do it too. Short version: Bush looks decisive, Rumsfeld looks autocratic, Feith looks like an idiot, Cheney and Wolfowitz look fanatical, Rice looks ineffectual and Powell comes off looking like the right man in the wrong job (hint, he should be one step higher). Woodward has good access, but fails to ask penetrating or even interesting questions at obvious points.

Rent it, don't buy it.

Click for the longer version.

I have chosen to just highlight a few selected quotes. Everybody knows what the story is, and all Woodward does is add detail to specific moments. This is good context, but I really didn't find any "smoking gun" in the book. If you didn't like Bush before, you won't like him any better now.

The first quote comes from a National Security Presidential Directive discussed by the principals (national security cabinet officials) and meant to represent the view of the President (and hence the government). It was discussed by all the principals at a meeting on August 14th, 2002. This is just bookeeping, just so we can finish, once and for all, the reasons we invaded Iraq:

"U.S. Goal: Free Iraq in order to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and associated programs, to prevent Iraq from breaking out of containment and becoming a more dangerous threat to the region and beyond. End Iraqi threats to its neighbors, to stop the Iraqi government's tyrannizing of its own population, to cut Iraqi links to and sponsorship of international terrorism, to maintain Iraq's unity and territorial integrity. And liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny and assist them in creating a society based on moderation, pluralism and democracy" (Woodward, Plan of Attack, pg. 155 - 156).

The fundamental objective of the US government involved weapons of mass destruction. Secondarily, delivery systems and programs to create both delivery systems and weapons are singled out. Third on the list is prevent Iraq from annoying anyone else in the region, specifically (fourth) Iraq's neighbors. Fifth, prevent more tyranny/brutality for the Iraqi people. Sixth, stop (mythical) links to international terrorism. Seventh, keep Iraq from breaking up (which would cause regional instability). Eighth on the list, and last, is to not only liberate the people, but bring them democracy. What this means is that everyone who is now claiming that the wonderful end to tyranny, the "freeing of 25 million people", is the beautiful end result of thirteen months of mess is just plain wrong. That goal is the eighth and final goal (stopping the tyranny, but not bringing democracy, barely got fifth). Repeat after me: we did not invade Iraq to free people. We invaded because of their WMD. If we don't find any WMD, then our primary reason for invasion was wrong. We should reflect on this. The source for this is a meeting where Rumsfeld, Cheney, Rice, Powell and a whole host of other high level officials all sat down and talked about this. Don't tell me they didn't know, or had other reasons later.

In a related note, let's note the quote from a few pages later:

"But General Franks had something important to add. 'Mr. President,' he said, 'we've been looking for Scud missiles and other weapons of mass destruction for ten years and haven't found any yet, so I can't tell you that I know that there are any specific weapons anywhere. I haven't seen Scud one.' Some at the NSC meeting thought this was Franks's way of saying he didn't have adequate targeting information...But it could, and should, have been a warning that if the intelligence was not good enough to make bombing decisions, it probably was not good enough to make the broad assertion, in public or in formal intelligence documents, that there was 'no doubt' Saddam had WMD. If there was no doubt, then precisely where were they?" (Woodward, Plan of Attack, pg. 173)

I hadn't considered this obvious point before. Beyond the CIA, the military itself has an intelligence component. The US had been flying anti-air and other punishment missions in the no-fly-zones for years, and a good portion of that must have been intelligence and recon flights. The military hadn't seen "Scud one" in ten years. We know now that this was because there weren't any, but shouldn't someone, somewhere have twigged on this? I have believed for a while that the intelligence failure evident in the failure to find WMD is unbelievably crucial and generally ignored. If we can't find WMD and regional missiles in a country that lived under UN sanctions and was (legally) penetrated by UN inspectors for six or so years, how in the hell do we expect to be able to find out anything about Iran? Pakistan? India? Al Queda? It's a failure of monumental proportions, far outside Pearl Harbor (where we did have belated warning, which we just misinterpreted).

I don't want to give Congress a free ride on this, but Congress is not realistically equipped to take on the job of actually analyzing intelligence. It's a watchdog - when something goes wrong, they jump in and fix it. Bush, and his re-election campaign, are making a whole lotta hay out of the fact that they had approval from Congress to do what they did, and are trying to shift part of the blame for the intelligence failure and planning failure over in that direction. Nope. Homey don't play that.

"Bush had 18 more House [of Representatives] members to the Cabinet Room on Thursday, September 26 [2002]. He opened by saying the last thing he wanted was to put troops in harm's way. 'Believe me, I don't like hugging the widows.'...He said that nothing could be worse than the present situation. Saddam had two of his own security guards killed to send a message to his inner circle, he [Bush] maintained. Then, putting the most dire spin on the intelligence, he stated, 'It is clear he has weapons of mass destruction - anthrax, VX; he still needs plutonium and he has not been shy about trying to find it. Time frame would be six months' to Iraq having a nuke if Iraq was able to obtain sufficient plutonium or enriched uranium - one of the most difficult tasks." (Woodward, Plan of Attack, pg. 189)

Congress should not have given Bush the open-ended authorization they did, but when Bush tells Members of Congress these "facts" (all of which have proven to be untrue, after the fact), what other outcome do we expect? People operate through information, and if they have bad information, they make bad decisions. That's what Congress did, and the responsibility for good information rests squarely in the Executive branch. As a snarky aside, the quote early in the cited passage about Bush hugging the widows is wrong too. He hasn't participated in any funeral for any soldier lost in Iraq.

Cheney comes off looking pretty bad in the book, mostly because he is so zealous in pursuit of invasion. Had everything worked out (found WMD, found Bin Laden or someone, peaceful change, democracy) he would come out of this looking like roses. It hasn't, so he looks bad. But there is an additional issue. Cheney, and perhaps the entire government, seems to have shifted dramatically the definition of a terrorist state:

"[Senator Bob] Graham asserted that the Bush administration, or at least Cheney, had changed the definition of the war on terrorism. 'Now, we're defining a terrorist state as those states which might have the ability to provide weapons of mass destruction, even if they themselves are not engaged in terrorist activities or providing sanctuary." (Woodward, Plan of Attack, pg. 194).

Think about that. A terrorist state is one that allows terrorists, provides sanctuary for them, bases for them, and (in addition) might (repeat, might) have the ability to provide weapons of mass destruction. Who isn't on this list? Sure - Iran, North Korea, (at the time) Iraq. But read the line again. "might have the ability to provide". That's an incredibly low bar. Heck, I can make some form of chemical weapons in a bathtub given a copy of the Anarchist's Cookbook and a few weeks (might blow up the house, but who's counting). What state can't produce this stuff? Who wouldn't be on this list? Heck, our strongest ally, Britain, meets the qualifications. All of NATO does, Japan, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Russia. The list is long, and the mind boggles. Is Cheney (according to Sen. Graham) so paranoid and worked up about this that we'll aggressively go after everyone? Who else believes this? It's just not a workable policy. You can't make foreign policy with that low a threshold for action. It's insane.

The next quote goes back to the whole issue of intelligence failure and responsibility. Bush had to know (or, someone beneath him should have informed him) that the intelligence he was using was a judgement - a reasoned guess. But he went charging along, telling people that he knew Iraq had WMD. I can sort of understand why you might be more positive in public - politics is a blood sport, and you can't show weakness. I don't agree, but I can understand it. But lying to the leader of an allied state? Sheer insanity:

"Bush [speaking to Spanish President Aznar in a private meeting at the White House] added, 'War is my last choice. Saddam is using his money to train and equip al Qaeda with chemicals, he's harboring terrorists." (Woodward, Plan of Attack, pg. 240 - 241).

Nowhere in any intelligence document in Woodward's book, or in any other source of news anywhere on the planet, have I seen even a hint that this might be true. Certainly, post war, there has been no evidence that their are any ties between Saddam and Bin Laden, much less evidence that Iraq trained and equipped al Qaeda terrorists with chemical WMD. Bush isn't saying this in public (which would be insane, in and of itself), but is telling this to the elected leader of an allied state in private session. He lies to the public, we can vote him out. He lies to other states, we can get seriously, seriously screwed. This is insane.

One more on the insanity front. He's meeting with three Iraqi exiled dissidents in January of 2003. There really isn't much these folks can do to help, but it seems to make Bush feel better to meet with people who have been actively harmed by Saddam. OK, fine. Useless, but fine. He starts asking them questions about what life is like in Iraq. Now, presumably, there are people in our own government who might be better equipped to answer this question than three dissidents who likely haven't stepped foot in the country in decades. And who have a biased view of life (they are getting all their information from fellow dissidents, in and out of the country, which isn't unbiased information), but we'll let that go. At the end of the discussion, Bush asks a question:

"'How do people in Iraq hear things?' Bush asked. 'Is it email?'" (Woodward, Plan of Attack, pg. 260).

Email? Email? This is a country run by a ruthless, paranoid dictator. Saddam keeps tight control over everything he can. He has separate security organizations that spy on each other in order to find any spys or traitors. No one has any privacy, and certainly any sort of statewide email system would make it much more difficult for Saddam to track down traitors. In addition: ITS A POOR COUNTRY THAT HAS BEEN UNDER SANCTION FOR A DECADE AND A HALF. MOST DON'T HAVE MUCH FOOD, MUCH LESS A COMPUTER OR A PHONE. And Bush seems to think it's normal, under those conditions, to spend time surfing the web to catch up on the news. Insane. He can't be that out of touch with what life is like, can he?

Overall, I can see why pro-Bush supporters find reason to like this book. Bush comes across as decisive and driven towards a goal. He doesn't let details slow him down, and seems ready move forward alone if necessary. Congress is something to be overcome. A big chunk of the book describes Powell having to convince him that going to the UN was appropriate (Bush really didn't want to, and others in the administration never wanted to). The UN then becomes, once it is brought in, another obstacle to be removed or overcome. Bush is fairly hands-off with the military - he told Rumsfeld in November of 2001 to work over plans on this (that quote has made waves already), and then just let the military hum along at their own pace to create better and better plans and implementation. For those pre-disposed to like Bush, there is plenty to like here. For those who don't, there is also plenty of ammunition (see above).

The fundamental flaw is that of Woodward's style. He clearly has plenty of access, but there is little to no analysis and reflection. Woodward's strength is that he is able (though the interviews) to reconstruct what is happening in private and compare that with what is happening in public statements and actions. The disparity between the two, especially with respect to where the military plan was while Bush claimed he hadn't decided for war, is often startling. But that is the sole strength. The public/private glimpse is interesting, but there are clearly points that beg to be analyzed - to find some form of informed commentary on the events Woodward is describing. There is no balance - all the statements and actions come from the administration. Sure, we can see they were saying one thing and doing another, but the same people are doing both, and in the end all we get is their view. Presumably, over time, other people will provide this (both from the pro and con side), and those will hopefully make better reading. Woodward's great strength is his access (direct quotes from the people who really made the decisions) and speed (he's the first to offer anything resembling a coherent account of this war). It also seems that he stops just when it gets interesting, as the post-war reconstruction has been significantly more difficult than the war itself, but you can't blame Woodward for that. Get this from the Library, or wait for the paperback (though by that time, a better account, with analysis might be around).

Posted by baltar at May 31, 2004 03:01 PM | TrackBack | Posted to Books