Bloodless Coup

James Fallows on Iran War Games

The new issue of The Atlantic has a fine article by James Fallows on war games that are being run in an attempt to come up with policy options to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. As to the conclusions of these games - there is no good military option. We don't know how many sites we would have to strike if we tried some sort of precision attack against their nuclear infrastructure, much less how we many we could actually destroy. Nor do we know how much time that would buy us. And it probably would turn the population of Iran against us at a time when we are hoping they will eventually oust their government, and make them more likely to be more hostile to us in the future. In addition, there is every chance that would then lead Iran to strike us, and quite apart from potential attacks against the US homeland, Iran could make things absolutely terrible (yes, things actually could get much worse) for the US in Iraq. Which isn't to say the US might not still launch some sort of attack. As the article states, countries do make unviable, wildly-risky choices at times. But the article also makes clear that we should be very wary of believing our own threats against the regime in Tehran. We shouldn't delude ourselves - there are no good military options.

Other interesting snippets from the article:

The military still doesn't consider what happens after a battle has been won to be part of its job. Even with the lessons of Iraq, it's clear that there is a great deal of hostility to the idea of using troops as peacekeepers. They don't want to be used that way. That orientation has significant consequences for how military options are planned, and the likely end results of such plans.

All involved in these games (former administration officials, currently-serving officers and national-security academics) think the decision-making structure of the Bush foreign policy team is a hideous, inept mess. To quote Michael Mazarr, a professor of national-security strategy at the National War College, "Companies deciding which kind of toothpaste to market have much more rigorous, established decision-making processes". As Fallows puts it, relying upon a small group of decision makers who never challenge fundamental prevailing views, exclude regional experts and continually fight amongst themselves (due to very weak coordination from the National Security Council) as led to "ruinous consequences" that could have been prevented.

David Kay notes that the individuals making a lot of the key decisions in any president's second-term will likely be the "second-best" and "second-brightest" people for their jobs (as they fill in for people who are burnt out). Those who remain from the first term will likely become increasingly fatigued, and that will shape their decision making. I'm not sure how much I agree with this, but there I've certainly read enough governmental decision making articles suggesting such effects to think that Kay might be onto something that's potentially quite important, but rarely discussed.