Bloodless Coup

Book Review: The Last Valley by Martin Windrow

The Last Valley, by Martin Windrow, was named by the Economist as one of the best books of 2004. It is primarily a discussion of the military defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, but like any good historian Windrow sets the stage by giving background on Vietnam, it's colonial legacy, the Viet Minh, and the French military.

I won't detail the story here. Suffice it to say, the French didn't understand the nature of the insurgency - either politically or militarily. The immediate reasons for the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu were military: they put a base that could only be supplied by air in a valley and then didn't hold the high ground surrounding the air strip, so the Viet Minh could and did bring in artillery and anti-aircraft guns (which the French intelligence had some evidence they had) that made it impossible to resupply the base. Additionally, even if the French could have kept the airbase open, Windrow presents evidence that the French Air Corps wasn't equipped sufficiently with cargo planes (to supply the base long term), attack aircraft (to serve as artillery for the base, since the French didn't bring in artillery guns), or pilots (to fly either of the first two) to sustain the battle over the six or so months it took. From a political perspective, the French nation wasn't behind this war (either the public or any of the parties that shared power from 1950 to 1954), and once the French suffered this very public defeat, they quickly abandoned the colony.

I see little parallel between the French actions in 1954 and the US today in Iraq. Hence, this book helps little in understanding the current conflict. It's a different story when we talk about the US actions in Vietnam (as I have argued in other book reviews).

Windrow's book is decent (not superb) military history, but only that. In his defense, that is all he sets out to do. The book lacks a more pronouced political analysis - one that would make the military decisions significantly more understandable. In addition, there is scanty information about the Vietnamese decision-making, tactics, and post-battle actions. This is likely not Windrow's fault, as the government of Vietnam has not been forthcoming with unbiased acconts.

The bottom line is that this is a military history, and not much else. I'm not sure why the Economist was so impressed. Not Recommended, unless you like that sort of topic.