Bloodless Coup

The Death of Traditional Foreign Policy As We Know It

Sometime over the last three years, Realism died.

Realism is the most-widely-accepted (which doesn't make it right, just accepted by more people) theory of international politics. It argues that states are self-interested actors (no matter what their position, power, religion, government, constitution, etc.), and will seek power in order to assure security and survival. All state policies are designed to gain, maintain or demonstrate their power to other states, in order to assure their security (thus, for example, the US "humanitarian" intervention into Somalia in 1992 can be explained by Realism as a demonstration of continued US power after the end of the Cold War, not actually a humanitarian gesture). States can make alliances with other states, but always with the recognition that the alliance can turn sour (remember, all states are fearful of their security, and any "friend" today can become an enemy tomorrow). Thus, state's foreign policies are always self-serving, always cautious and incremental, and always prudent.

Realism has never been accepted as "right" (in the sense of fully explaining all actions by all international states) by political scientists (the primary alternative theory is Liberalism, and a more recent alternative is Constructivism, and finally (to a significantly lesser degree Marxism). Realism has been, none the less, the dominant theory. Not only accepted by academic political scientists, it dominated the policy community.

Kissenger is the most-cited case, but a clear case can be made for Dulles (SecState under Eisenhower), Rusk (Kennedy/Johnson), Haig (Reagan), Schultz (Reagan), Baker (Bush I), Scowcroft (Nat. Security Advisor to Ford and Bush I), Brzezinski (NSA to Carter), and Powell (Chair of the Joint Chiefs under Bush I, Nat. Sec. Advisor to Reagan, Sec. State to Bush II). Again, not everyone is a Realist, but they dominate the foreign policy community - and especially dominate the right-wing foreign policy community. Or did.

Realists are often described as amoral - they are accused of ignorning human rights issues, humanitarian disasters, genocides, and authoritarian regimes. This is true, though not because they are "amoral". The Realists reply that they are concerned with the power of the US and defending the sovereignty (right to make our own decisions and do things our way) of the US. If the US were to take up arms to defend and protect every downtrodden set of citizens, the US would fast dissipate all it's power, and be vulnerable to other states - then we (ourselves) wouldn't be free, and would be in need of rescuing. Thus, while the rest of the world contains horrors unimaginable, the US has no duty to right those wrongs (and, in fact, actions to right those wrongs would only make the US more vulnerable by using our power). This isn't to say that Realists avoid the use of force (no; prudent use of force to "gain, maintain, or demonstrate power" is key to Realism), or that Realists can't be glad when a use of force that primarily sought to benefit the US can also achieve humanitarian ends (see: Panama, for example).

Whatever the faults of Realism (and they are many, both in the sense of Realism's failure to explain the historical record and in Realism's prescriptions for policy), it cannot be accused of a failure to husband our resouces and power. Realism is, inherently, a conservative policy: power is used sparingly, and only when the use of power will benefit the US directly. Any foreign policy that follows a Realist bent will accept genocides (preventing them costs the US power for no gain; see Cambodia - 1970s), alliances with brutal dicators (having them increases our power and security; see Phillipines under Marcos, Iraq under Hussein, Saudi Arabia under King Saud, etc.), and famines and floods (alleviating the suffering costs us power for no gain; see Somalia, 1993); however, accepting all of these awful events means that the inherent power of the US is retained, and our own interests, power, security, territory, and sovereignty are protected. Any President that follows such a policy cannot be faulted, though they might be criticized. Prudent Realism isn't pretty, but it is safe.

Bush, however, seems to have thrown all of this out the window. Invading Afghanistan was clearly Realist: a clear threat. Invading Iraq was debateably Realist: if we (honestly) invaded because we saw a clear threat from Saddam's WMD (that don't and didn't exist) that fits with Realism; however, there is more and more evidence (this is brutal on the NeoCons) that the primary purpose of the invasion was to "fix" the Middle East through the application of democracy by external force. If that were the actual US policy, that isn't a Realist one. This isn't to say that we shouldn't laud the (morally correct) attempt to free 25 million people. However, a Realist would ask: "Is it worth the cost to US reputation and, more importantly, US power?" Again, not everyone is a Realist, and many would agree or disagree with the US invasion on a wide variety of reasons. Realism, however, is the core of US foreign policy for decades, and the Iraqi invasion deviated from years of prudence.

Which brings us to the US-Indian Nuclear Power Agreement. However one views Iraq (prudent use of force to remove a threat versus inappropriate use of force to accomplish moral ends), the US agreement to accept India as a nuclear power and to (essentially) furnish India with nuclear fuel that will be used to create Indian nuclear weapons is clearly not a Realist agreement.

Read the WaPo article. It makes clear that traditional concerns of nuclear proliferation (which seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the technology to make them in order to - among other things - keep that power reserved to the US and it's allies) were tossed out the window. The authors of the new policy (Rice and Zelikow; an advisor to Rice at times) couch the new policy in terms of Realism: using a rising India to balance a rising China (leaving the US, friendly with India, on top still):

The paper promoted geostrategic cooperation between the two countries rooted strongly in U.S. defense and military sales to India as a way to counter China's influence. "If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities such that India's nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter against the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025," Tellis wrote.

Making an alliance to enhance ones power doesn't violate Realism. However, a Realist would argue that those alliances are fragile, and are only based on limited-mutual-need; alliances allow states to band together to protect themselves against larger threats. Self-interested states will end the alliances after the threat has disappeard (and, thus, the reasons for the alliance have vanished). Notice, however, that the US-India deal isn't an alliance of equals - it commits India to do nothing (we get no help against China), while India gets everything (tacit acceptance of their nuclear weapons program and actual help in terms of technology and fuels for more weapons). Thus, America finds itself in the position of significantly increasing the power of another (potentially hostile?, asks a Realist) state while getting no assurances that the hand extended in friendship is likely to be reciprocated (present Indian claims notwithstanding; that and a dollar will buy you a cup of coffee). Were Kissenger dead, one assumes he'd be turning over in his grave.

How does the US justify this significant violation of years of US policy?

Bush had reached the conclusion that the nuclear concerns carried less weight than the enormous benefits that a broad partnership with a large and friendly democracy could bring.

This, then, is the death of Realism. Bush decides that India can become a trusted friend because India is a "friendly democracy" (this, of course, ignores the fact that democracies don't have to be friendly, that India's gain in power will significantly piss of the Pakistanis, that increased Indian nuclear power will destabilize the Indian-Pakistani relationship, and that India has it's own share of fundamentalism - Hindu, not Muslim - and may not always be a democracy). Realist don't give a proverbial rat's ass whether another state is a democracy or not; power is power, security is security. Depending on another state to help us out because they are a democracy is not "prudent"; Indian interests are not American interests today, and Lord knows what divergence in policy is likely in the future. (Recognize, again, that Realism has it's flaws; Realism cannot hope to explain why the US and Britain have become friendly for almost 200 years when, by power considerations, we should have been adversaries.) Nonetheless, Bush/Rice have thrown prudence out the window in order to sign up India on our side (again, I'm not sure why they are on our "side" when they don't have to actually do anything to help us and they gain US nuclear technology) because they are a "friendly democracy". Last I checked, Pakistan was a "friendly democracy", and I don't think their association with nuclear technology has turned out well.

The US-Indian nuclear deal is bad on many levels (Realist, Liberal, and Institutionalist off the top of my head), but it is particularly bad for the reasons outlined here: many decades of prudent and cautious US policy have now been officially tossed out the window. Moreover, what policy has replaced Realism? What ideals and goals now govern US policy? (If it is Neoconservatism we really have to talk).

I have never been a committed Realist; it's explantory failures in the historical record are too numerous for me to overlook. However, one can't ignore the self-interest of states, and the actions that derive from them, that also exist in the historical record. One of Realisms greatest strengths (as a policy) is it's inherent conservatism: following a Realist set of policies may allow for greater evil (dictators, genocide, etc.) in the world, but won't make the US worse off. Realism has been the underlying theory behind US policy for decades; I'm nervous about just discarding it without any significant debate, discussion or notice. In a more concrete sense, I'm decidedly nervous about expanding India's power.

This is a brave, new world the US embarks on. Hold on tight, it could get bumpy.

Posted by baltar at April 3, 2006 11:24 AM | TrackBack | Posted to International Affairs | Politics | The Academy