August 07, 2006

Force and Politics

I'm disturbed by the continued arguments (most, though not exclusively, right wing) that the use of force solves problems for states. I'm not going to bother with a laundry list of sites who argue this, but it's inherent in the PNAC idea (liberate Iraq, create liberal, secular, democratic, capitalist state), and continues into various arguments (again mostly, though not exclusively, right wing) that solving our problems in Iraq (and, by extension, Israel's issues with Hezbollah in Lebanon) would be solved by greater application of force. If we were either more aggressive, more ruthless, and/or willing to "take off the gloves", we'd be able to succeed.

I'm mostly disturbed by these arguments by their lack of historical accuracy.

We need to define some terms before proceeding, or at least set some limits. States have used violence for as long (actually, longer) than there have been states. However, what's argued by those in favor of more force is the idea that violence can solve the problems that states have with each other. That goes beyond the idea that violence is inherent in the international system, and argues that states can use force as a method of resolving issues between them. Violence is inherently political (pace Clauzwitz), but violence as a solution (a resolution between states such that no further dispute remains) is, I would argue, very rare. Yet, it seems to me, this is the argument that the "more force will produce results" school seems to believe: if we use more force (in Iraq, in North Korea, in Iran, etc.), we can "win" against those who fight against us. More force will produce a victory (defeat, from their perspective) so profound (so complete, so extensive) that the opposition will actually realize they are beaten and will "give up" (interpreted as letting us achieve the best possible policy outcome). If we "take off the gloves" we can hurt them so badly, so completely, that their will to resist the changes we want to impose (suggest, if we want to be nice) will disappear, and we will have "won." All that is preventing us from succeeding (in Iraq, North Korea, etc.) is our own will, our own culture, our own rules. If we'd just ignore our own doubts and self-imposed restrictions, we could "win".

Again, I think this point of view (granted, the above is likely a mis-characterization, but not entirely) misses the historical record. The use of force by the US has been characterized more by the use of force to achieve limited objectives (minimizing present policy differences; using force to accomplish a minimum acceptable win-set for the US) as opposed to complete victory (where the policies of the opponents changes to the point where they are never a threat or opponent). I want to discuss some historical uses of force by the US (limited to US cases; obviously one could expand the data to other countries), and re-acquaint people with the limits to what US use of force has accomplished.

Spanish-American War (1898): Yes, this was a very long time ago. However, this is a good case. The US entered this war (of choice) with a remarkably limited set of objectives (remove Cuba from Spanish influence). We succeeded in that very limited aim (and added the Phillippines, and a few other Pacific Islands as well). There are two points worth making here. First, we had very limited war aims (seize an island ninety-odd miles from Florida, protected by a country some three thousand miles away). However, we wanted to "liberate" Cuba, and provide "freedom" to it's people. In a strict sense, we accomplished this goal (we kicked the Spanish out of Cuba, rather easily). However (and this is the second point), we were unable to effectively "control" either Cuba or the Phillippines. In both cases the US found itself involved in guerilla wars fairly quickly after the actual war (with Spain) had ended. In the Phillippines, we "won" the civil war (the US put down the local insurgents, though we gave the island up for independence after World War II), though in Cuba we "lost" (we gave the Cubans their independence after it became clear that the insurgency/violence would escalate). The war we started achieved our limited war aims (Spain no longer controlled Cuba), but force was ultimately unsuccessful in providing a complete victory (we were drawn into lengthy guerilla wars, though we won only one of those).

World War I: The conventional wisdom here is that we saved Europe from Germany. This is only partially true. While the US entered the war in late 1917 (it began in 1914), our troops didn't enter combat until the summer of 1918 - after Germany's final offensive, which broke against almost entirely British and French defenses. In the end, Germany surrendered - with conditions - rather than face invasion by French/British/US forces. US force was instrumental in achieving the conditional Germany surrender (technically, it was the clear threat of a massive US buildup leading to an invasion of Germany proper that led to the surrender), but in the end, even considering the massive loss of life and property over the war, the settlement left a great deal to be desired in terms of fixing the underlying conditions that led to the war in the first place. While the US may have been willing in 1918 to continue the war into Germany itself (in hopes of a surrender of a more unconditional sort), there was both domestic US pressure to end the war as well as a lack of willingness by Britain and France (exhausted from the war) to continue. In the end, the use of force succeeded in ending the threat of German aggression (temporarily), but didn't solve the underlying policy disagreements. Bluntly, even though several million people lost their lives in this war, the loss by Germany was not (in the language of the PNAC) sufficiently sever that their will to resist was broken. We know this because World War II was, in part, directly tied to the disconnect between the political resolution (Versailles) and the military one (Germany signed an Armistice, not a surrender; and German forces were never routed - the war ended with German troops on French/Belgian soil, not German).

World War II, Europe: This is as close a case as we can come to where force succeeded in defeating the will of the enemy, to the point where the underlying political disagreements were completely eliminated (some time post-war): the states became allies. World War II (in Europe) ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany (I'm ignoring Italy here). However, the military cost of achieving that unconditional surrender was the complete occupation of almost the entire country (while I don't have figures, I'd imagine that the allies had managed to take over 90+% of Germany before the German surrender in April of 1945, and they occupied the rest short afterward). Occupying Germany took several hundred thousand American soldiers, a hundred thousand or so British troops, tens of thousands of French troops, and likely a million or so Soviet troops. This concentration of force was so overwhelming that little resistance (insurgency) was seen after the war ended. In contrast, Iraq (170,000 square miles, versus 140,000 square miles for Germany) was occupied by only about 150,000 American troops in 2003. Force, in this case, was successful at "solving" the political problems with Germany, but it was a great deal ("overwhelming" wouldn't be too strong a phrase) of force. It is telling that the German/World War II case is held up as the template of "winning" a war, while the cost (in lives, property, and - most importantly - active soldiers standing over the defeated enemy civillian population) is often forgotten.

World War II, Japan: Japan is an interesting case. Yes, they surrendered, as Germany did. They surrendered mostly unconditionally: they kept their Emperor. This isn't a trivial point: this was a significant condition to their surrender. Moreover, the Emperor was instrumental in getting the surrender, and in enforcing the post-war reconstruction/rehabilitation. Japan's military government was fully prepared (and actively preparing) to resist a planned invasion of the main islands by the Americans (the US was planning this invasion for the spring of 1946). Given the fanatical resistance by most Japanese military forces in defending the islands in the Pacific the US invaded leading to Japan, the operating assumption by US military planners was that an invasion would be possible, but with heavy loss of US life and even heavier loss of Japanese life. The Japanese knew this as well. The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki force the Emperor to consider the cost to his country of continued fighting. In the end, he ordered the government to surrender. All the bombs dropped on Japan never broke the will of the population to resist America - in the end it was the actions by a single individual to force an end to the fighting. Again, force was successful in completely changing the nature of politics between the US and Japan, though it was again overwhelming force. In other words, the lengthy island-hopping campaign that brought the US within the range of heavy bombers to fire-bomb Japanese cities failed to break the will of the Japanese state to resist the US, and failed to end the war. The atomic weapons also failed in this regard. It is only the actions of a single individual (the Emperor) that lead to the surrender without invasion. It is hard to argue that overwhelming force achieved the political solution (expect through the actions of the Emperor).

The Korean War: A clear failure, except in the very narrow sense of preserving South Korea. While this was an initial war aim (following the North Korean invasion), the US/UN aims were quickly expanded to the idea of reunifying the entire nation. This, clearly, failed to happen. The more limited war aims (protecting South Korea) were achieved. However, in no way did force of arms succeed in "defeating" either the North Korean military (who were demoralized and retreating, but never surrendered) or Chinese military (who fought the US/UN to a stalemate, which is where the war ended). Force succeeded in limiting the North Korean aggression, but was not successful at imposing political conditions on the North Koreans (and clearly not the Chinese).

Vietnam: An abject failure. While it is true that the US "never lost a battle to the North Vietnamese", it is just as true that the US lost the war (an American military officer is supposed to have made a remark to a North Vietnamese military officer at the talks in Paris in the 1970s to this effect). The US had massive force, and used over half a million troops (at our peak in 1968). We were never successful in defeating either the Viet Cong or North Vietnam (to the degree they were different). Force was clearly unsuccessful at achieving a military solution, much less a political one.

US military actions post Vietnam have followed the Vietnam pattern: force was successful in a limited sense (solving the immediate problems), but unsuccessful in a larger sense: the display of force by the US never succeeded in causing something resembling unconditional surrender in our opponents (with the possible exception of Panama in 1989). There is a long list of US actions: Lebanon, 1983; Grenada, 1984; Panama, 1989; Gulf War I, 1990 - 1991; Somalia, 1993; Bosnia/Serbia 1996/1998; Afghanistan, 2001; and Iraq, 2003. Perhaps the greatest US success through force of arms was Grenada, though it is hard to argue Grenada was any sort of actual (or potential) threat: it is clear that US force was overwhelming and ended any sort of quasi-Communist actions by Grenada. Panama is a similiar case: the US invasion removed any issues the US had with Panama (though I think one can reasonably argue the disagreements the US had with Panama were mostly the result of Noriega). Other than Grenada and Panama, US uses of force have often succeeded in their limited intents (Gulf War I, ending Saddam's aggression; Bosnia/Serbia, ending the violence; Afghanistan, removing the Taliban; Gulf War II, removing Saddam) and sometimes failed in their limited missions (Lebanon, didn't succeed in stabilizing the government; Somalia; we didn't succeed in restoring order). In no case did the use of US force succeed in "overwhelming" the opposing forces such that we were able to impose optimal (for us) solutions. We pushed Saddam out of Kuwait in 1991, but failed to reform his aggressive/revisionist manner through our defeat of his military forces. We (along with Europe) were able to impose a cease-fire on both Bosnia (and later Serbia) in the late 1990s, but our use of force did not end the ethnic cleansing. We removed the Taliban government in 2001, but have clearly failed to end the Taliban ideology (they have returned in 2003, in strength). We removed Saddam in 2003, but a raging insurgency was not cowed by the precision of US arms, and threatens to turn Iraq into a civil war (if it isn't there already).

This isn't to say that violence hasn't succeeded in limited aims. It clearly has. The historical record, however, argues that violence is not an effective tool at achieving the imposition of political solutions that remove the underlying political disagreements. We have not been able to use force to affect political change in the sense of being able to remake states/societies to the point where they are (at best) allies or (at worst) neutral to the US. I want to make clear, again, that I'm not arguing that force is useless (it clearly isn't), nor am I arguing that force is wrong (that's a moral position, and I'm not debating morality here). I'm arguing that force is, historically, a limited instrument that is best employed in pursuit of limited ends. Historically, very few uses of force have resulted in political solutions that didn't rebound back onto the US (require future diplomatic/political/military effort) at some point in the future.

This isn't anything resembling a formal study. This is more in the way of a hypothesis, or thought experiment. However, anyone with a reasonable knowledge of history should look at the PNAC/WingNut argument that more force will solve our problems in Iraq and Afghanistan (and, by extension, Israel's problems in Lebanon) with a significantly jaundiced eye.

Posted by baltar at August 7, 2006 08:03 PM | TrackBack | Posted to Extremism | International Affairs | Iraq | Military Affairs | War | War and History


Comments

Rather than nitpick historical points I'll just throw out that reading through this 2 things stand out to me.

1) The scope of the aims - force can work, but usually just when it is aimed at the actions of a fairly small clique, and only when a. you are trying to manuever that clique in a direction they would be willing to go if they saw the scope of the force that would be brought down on them or b. when you are trying to move the clique from power and have a good shot at it being replaced by a set who's likely to be more to your liking on a host of matters. When it comes to moving a country or trying to change deeply embedded positions/beliefs force is much less likely to work.

2) And this is the one that always irritates me on this topic - time. People always talk about how more force will fix problem X, As if fixing the problem once takes it off the table forever. They don't talk about the one week, one month, one year, five years aftermath. This is of course related to the first topic. If a people is strongly committed to something, will they give it up over time? If you use force to deny it to them, and maybe kill lots of their loved ones in the process, isn't it much more likely they'll want it even more.

Other thoughts - people often talk about how more force would be just swell, as if all force was equal - but obviouly leadership, planning, implementation and how a war will fit into the broader strategic environment are also matters of some concern (and often war X might help you with problem A, but hurt you on problems C and D, and give your enemies G H and J room to manuveur).

And finally force often entails us doing things that supposedly we'd never ever want to do morally (which should matter to those of a Jeffersonian persuasion, to use Mead's language), and things that divert resources from our own economic prosperity (a problem for those of a Hamiltonian persuasion).

So, unsurprisingly, I tend to agree with you, and am troubled by the unnecessary costs the war mongers sometimes place on the country. Though I think force can be used effectively in some instances (Noriega/Panama being an excellent exampe).

Thank goodness we're super-rich and have a long tradition of skilled diplomats in this country to solve ou problems in more efficient ways. Oh, we're wildly in debt and not doing much diplomacy anymore? Whoops.

Posted by: Armand at August 7, 2006 10:58 PM | PERMALINK

Good points. I also wanted to highlight (with reference to your #1) that moving a polity/society usually involves an overwhelming application of resources on our part (see: Germany, World War II). In other words, succeeding in remaking some society in our image (whether possible or not) clearly takes a massive effort (troops, resources, money, etc.). We clearly haven't put forth that effort in Iraq (or Afghanistan).

The time part is interesting to: these aren't usually short-term actions. On the other hand, it's worth noting that in the time since we invaded Iraq (41 months ago) we had accomplished significantly more in World War II (41 months after Pearl Harbor is approximately April 1945, which is when Germany surrendered).

Posted by: baltar at August 8, 2006 05:23 PM | PERMALINK

Accomplished significantly more, yes, but with a level of national committment that would be absolutely unthinkable in modern times.

Posted by: jacflash at August 8, 2006 06:21 PM | PERMALINK

No, not "unthinkable." Difficult, but not unthinkable. Just post-9/11, my impression (annectodally(sp?)) was that the country was willing to bear a significantly increased burden in the name of fighting terror. The administration's response was "go back to the malls." I think that societies can respond to extraordinary times (difficult as they are). Thus, it isn't impossible to imagine re-making Iraq (though it is difficult, even given all the breaks). However, that level of national committment would require a significantly larger threat than Iraq presented.

Posted by: baltar at August 8, 2006 10:46 PM | PERMALINK

I largely agree with that and it's one reason why I find talk of World War 3 really strange - we don't really see the threat in remotely the same way - it's on a vastly different scale. And given the large degree to which threat perception drives politics (especially IR) ...

That said I find it hard to imagine a WWII like war effort ever coming to pass again. I think changes in culture and the economy would make that extremely hard. But we could certainly have developed a larger committment than we did, if the president had sought that.

Posted by: Armand at August 9, 2006 10:18 AM | PERMALINK

I don't envision a World War II level of effort again either, but we don't face a developed/industrial threat like Germany today (or on the horizon) either. If China goes more and more hostile, and more and more developed over the next 10 to 20 years, I could see it there (plus, we get some bonus xenophobia with them).

Posted by: baltar at August 9, 2006 10:26 AM | PERMALINK

I don't think the country is capable of uniting behind a common effort short of something like a hostile alien invasion, and maybe not even then. The Vietnam model/meme will be very hard to displace.

Posted by: jacflash at August 9, 2006 07:06 PM | PERMALINK

I am no friend of PNAC, nor would I consider myself right-leaning, but I would argue that your idea of political success in war cannot be seperated from moral success. That is, wars are not simply "policy by other means". They contain moral implications and are fought for (or at least appeal to) moral ends. In fact, I would argue that our use of force historically has been initially employed to solve moral issues and not political ones.

Is there a war that we have entered for non-moral reasons? Have we used violence or force to prosecute a war or conflict without some moral reasoning to support it? No. Of course, the moral reasoning used to support the use of force can be faulty (ie. Iraq, Vietnam), but it nevertheless is present. What happens is that once the moral issue(s) is resolved, we then have to find a solution to the political problems that have resulted.

My argument, therefore, is that the use of force can solve the problems that states have with each other as long as we view those problems as moral and not just political. Violence is not only inherently political, it is also inherently moral. In fact, I would go so far to say it is almost entirely moral. So, the PNAC appeals to more violence as a means to solve our problems is, in their view, correct as they see the issue as a moral issue and not a political one.

Posted by: Bishop at August 10, 2006 06:36 AM | PERMALINK

On a dimly related tangent, Baltar, this may amuse you.

Posted by: jacflash at August 10, 2006 06:59 AM | PERMALINK

Baltar will no doubt delve into the finer points of realist theory in response to your point, but a quick comment on morality. States are fundamentally interested in self-preservation, and at times (and depending on your theoretical view of state behavior) interested in increasing power (the means to self-preservation. The maintenance and acquisition of power has nothing to do with morality.

I think the key phrase you use is:

Of course, the moral reasoning used to support the use of force

Used to support it, yes. The real and only motivator, no.

Posted by: binky at August 10, 2006 08:24 AM | PERMALINK


you think because in the end the emperor was the one who made the decision for Japan to surrender that that means that the emperor, and no the atomic bombs, was the real reason for the end of WWII? thats a twistedly short-sighted view of cause and effect.

its funny, that must be the same approach that liberals took in order to come to the conclusion that the Supreme Court (and not the voters will expressed through the electoral college combined with the laws of the nation) decided the 2000 election.

Posted by: at August 11, 2006 11:39 AM | PERMALINK

OK, I'll skip over getting into Florida 2000 (I can't believe that anyone can really defend the Court's action in an intellectually honest way) since it's not remotely relevant to the topic at hand and note that I'm puzzled by the earlier comment. It seems to suggest that what's moral is not inherently political. Dresden, the Tokyo fire-bombing - there are all kinds of things that took place in even the Goodest of the Good Wars that might well have been deemed immoral under other circumstances, but weren't viewed that way given the crisis at hand.

Which is not to say that morality is entirely thrown out the window in a huge war (thankfully) - but our views on it certainly shift.

And, well Baltar can state his own views on this, but I'm a little perplexed at what you seem to be saying about the A bombs. They didn't win us the war - we would have won anyway. But they did speed up matters.

Oh, and of course b/c I am political psych guy I suppose it is my job to point out that reactions to those weapons differed among people, and if someone other than the emperor had been in charge you might have seen very different behavior. I mean Hitler was ordering vast swaths of his own territory to be destroyed by the Germans to prevent things falling into the Allies' hands. The emperor looked at things (like his country turning into a burning wasteland) differently.

Posted by: Armand at August 11, 2006 12:06 PM | PERMALINK

1. I'm not a liberal.

2. No, I'm saying that the combination of atomic bombs and the Emperor won us a cheaper victory than we would have had, absent those conditions. For all of the US firebombing of Japan, it is clear that we never "broke" their will to the point that they would have surrendered easily to us.

3. The Supreme Court did decide the 2000 election; they ended any political wrangling about how much (and how) to recount in Florida.

4. The Supreme Court acts to decide if the actions of individuals or the government are unconstitutional. It doesn't matter if everyone wants to do something; if the actions are unconstitutional, its job of the court to prevent (or redress) violations of the constitution.

5. This isn't a thread about the Supreme Court. Leave it alone.

Posted by: baltar at August 11, 2006 04:40 PM | PERMALINK

Ooh, wait, though. Even though you are a Republican, if you don't support our dear leader, that makes you a liberal Baltar. Get with the program.

Posted by: binky at August 11, 2006 04:42 PM | PERMALINK

Binky, the maintenance and aquisition of power has everything to do with morality. Every state which is actively protecting and sustaining their power, or are are seeking more of it, have to make a moral decision. That is, they have to weigh the cost of determining if gaining and keeping power is morally right (from their view of morality--of course this assumes that morality is not objective which is another issue entirely).

Nevertheless, at its deepest levels, the application of force/violence to solve state problems has to be primarily moral. This is not to say that political ends don't eventually follow, it's just that they are secondary. A state must determine the moral 'rightness' of an action before that action can have political implications.

Posted by: Bishop at August 11, 2006 10:03 PM | PERMALINK

You can say "has to be" all you want to, but it doesn't make it true. Unless you are talking about an extremist moral relativism, in which any action can be rationalized by any state as being a moral action. And at that point, moral ceases to have meaning, and we are left with amoral states acting purely in their own self-interest. Unless amoral self-interest is the universal moral?

To be clear, I do not believe that the maintenance and acquisition of power is immoral, merely that it is amoral. Then again, maybe you want to argue the morality of the September Campaign?

Posted by: binky at August 11, 2006 10:39 PM | PERMALINK

Bishop, you may believe that point of view but it is not the one accepted by just about everyone who studies international politics. The most dominant theory of international politics ("realism", which traces intellectual roots back to Thucydides in 500 BC and onto Machiavelli in about 1500 AD) argues that states are entirely amoral and only concered with issues of power and security. States may claim the moral high ground, at times, but that is only a cover for actions grounded in gaining, maintaining, or demonstrating their power (demonstrations of power can deter potential attackers).

You are welcome to disagree with this position (there are multiple theories of international politics that disagree with "realism"), but none (that's NONE) base the explanation of state's actions on the morality of that state.

I think you are dangerously close to a tautology: when we see states gain power we know they think it was morally right, thus morals are fundamental to international politics. That doesn't really tell us anything.

Finally, your statement "A state must determine the moral 'rightness' of an action before that action can have political implications" cannot be true. Any action will likely (almost always) have political implications (change the balance of power, favor one domestic group over another, repress one ethnic group, invade another country, etc.) independent of any moral determination of the actor (the state that acts). Moreover, even if the acting state has a moral reason for acting that does not mean that the action will result in what the state intended (unintended consequences, failed plans, resistance, etc.).

Morality isn't irrelevant to international politics (it can be critical), but it isn't determinative of actions.

Posted by: baltar at August 11, 2006 10:46 PM | PERMALINK

Let's not use the argument that because everyone believes something to be true, then it means that it is. You are too intelligent for that. I may not be in line with what the majority thinks about international politics, but that doesn't mean that I'm wrong. 500 years ago, everyone knew that the earth was the center of the universe, but that didn't mean that the few who belived otherwise were wrong.

States are not amoral. Binky makes that argument for me. Binky claims that if any action can be rationalized by any state as being a morally right action, then morality ceases to have meaning. If that's true, then Binky claims that we are left with amoral states acting in purely self-interest (BTW, isn't self-interest a moral claim--also isn't 'self-interest' and 'amoral' a contradiction in terms). Binky calls that extremist moral relativism. I call it your view (which by the way, Binky in the next paragraph says is his/her view as well). If a state can rationalize any action as being right, it does not follow that morality ceases to have meaning. It may mean that their morality is wrong when compared to the morality of another state. In real terms, we believe (and hopefuly continue to believe) that Nazi Germany was a morally corrupt state. That is, their actions (at least some of them) as a state were morally wrong. If that is the case, then we have to conclude that there is some objective meaning to morality, as how could our morality be more right than the Nazis?...right compared to what? It is/was more right compared to some objective standard of morality. Therefore, there must be some moral 'rightness' to the world. I argue that we (states and individuals) try to meet that moral standard in all actions, regardless of whether those actions are state or individually sponsored. States are not amoral for one very simple reason: they are made, governed, and maintained by people. People are moral beings (please let's not argue this point). As such, since they make, manage, and maintain the state, the state is moral as well.

To use a previous example of Truman's decision to drop the A-bomb on Japan. That decision was a moral decision. In fact, it was an intensely moral decision. Did it have political implications? You bet. It also had moral implications. But, at its beginning, it was a moral decision. Is it morally right to drop two bombs on Japan that would kill hundreds of thousands of people? That is what Truman, and, as he represented the United States, the state had to decide. That decision certainly involved looking at the political environment, but that did not preclude the fact that he morally had to come to grips with killing that many people before he could form a plan of action to handle the political fallout. For a look at just how moral this decision was see http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/index.php

Lastly, Baltar makes the argument that morality "isn't irrelevant to international politics (it can be critical), but it isn't determinative of actions." Again, morality is nothing but determinative of actions. How do we determine what is the right action if we don't appeal to some morality?

I realize that we probably are not going to convince each other of our arguments :) but I'd like to make a request. Can you give me an example of a state's amoral action? I'd like to see what you consider to be an amoral, self-interested decision. Thanks.

Posted by: Bishop at August 12, 2006 07:51 AM | PERMALINK

Hit the buzzer...wrong again! Self-interest is not a moral claim.

Unless, oh wait, Baltar, this might be one of your people. Getcher Ayn Rand quotes at the ready.

Posted by: binky at August 12, 2006 10:19 PM | PERMALINK
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