Per the Washington Post (today), we see (perhaps) the true cost of Abu Ghraib and other associated "problems" in the wars on terror and Iraq:
China accused the United States on Thursday of using double standards to judge human rights in other countries, adding to a growing list of nations suggesting the government that produced the Abu Ghraib prison abuses has no business commenting on what happens elsewhere.
(snip)
The sentiment it [the Chinese statement] expressed -- the Bush administration has compromised on human rights and has no standing to criticize others -- reflected similar views in a number of other foreign capitals where governments were chastised for violating human rights standards. Although such chafing often follows Washington's annual report, it has become more intense and more readily voiced since U.S. abuses of Iraqi and other prisoners were publicized around the world.
Just for the record, the "other foreign capitals" that have rejected our authority to chastise them for human rights abuses includes Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, Turkey and Egypt as well as China.
This may be the true cost of Abu Ghraib. While the actual number of Iraqis harmed at the prison may be small, the US has lost any real ability to shine a spotlight on the practices of other countries. And that has real, human costs. The suffering of unknown prisoners (likely political) in Egypt, China and Russia can be more easily hidden (and justified) and the ability of the US to force those states to be more democratic becomes that much harder.
Bush may want to facilitate the global movement of democracy, but it becomes increasingly more difficult to force change through peaceful means without the moral high ground. Of course, if we had punished the guilty parties for the prison scandal and then ceased doing it again, we might have a leg to stand on. Nope:
In November 2002, a newly minted CIA case officer in charge of a secret prison just north of Kabul allegedly ordered guards to strip naked an uncooperative young Afghan detainee, chain him to the concrete floor and leave him there overnight without blankets, according to four U.S. government officials aware of the case.
The Afghan guards -- paid by the CIA and working under CIA supervision in an abandoned warehouse code-named the Salt Pit -- dragged their captive around on the concrete floor, bruising and scraping his skin, before putting him in his cell, two of the officials said.
As night fell, so, predictably, did the temperature. By morning, the Afghan man had frozen to death.
After a quick autopsy by a CIA medic -- "hypothermia" was listed as the cause of death -- the guards buried the Afghan, who was in his twenties, in an unmarked, unacknowledged cemetery used by Afghan forces, officials said. The captive's family has never been notified; his remains have never been returned for burial. He is on no one's registry of captives, not even as a "ghost detainee," the term for CIA captives held in military prisons but not registered on the books, they said.
I'm sure the Chinese (and Russians, and Egyptians, and...) understand.
Posted by baltar at March 3, 2005 11:40 AM | TrackBack | Posted to International AffairsSay Baltar,
Did I miss the part where they listened to us and changed their policies on torturing prisoners because we had the moral high ground? I don't think moral high ground has been too persuasive in changing other cultures who believe might makes right, ever since the Athenians wiped out the Melians in 416 BC.
Morris,
You could certainly be right. Moral high ground plus $0.50 will get you a cheap cup of coffee.
Unless it gets you more. This is the whole "soft power" debate: your guns, tanks and soldiers will let you invade and force people to do things, but how much influence does the US have to achieve similar change through non-violent means? These would be economic sanctions, trade treaties, political treaties (defense pacts, most-favored-nation status, etc.), and, yes, official pronouncements from the moral high ground. Unlike guns & tanks, this stuff is very difficult to measure and examine for effectiveness. The fact that it is difficult doesn't mean it doesn't work or doesn't exist (it also doesn't mean it does work or does exits).
Lets take a concrete example: the US has had some success in recent years in getting dissidents out of China. These are political activists who are trying to force China to become more democratic, and are often vocal about the problems in the Chinese political system. The Chinese government often imprisons these people. The US has (rarely, but successfully) been able to convince the Chinese government to turn a few of these people over to the US (where they come for medical care - Chinese prisons can be bad for your health - or for academic or other jobs). The US has generally been successful at this for cases with much-publicized individuals, where the US goverment can stand on a global soapbox and point to the mis-treatment of specific individuals in China who are being punished for obvious political (i.e., not theives or murderers) reasons.
In the future, given the Chinese statements, will we be able to use our soapbox to get any dissidents out? Does the US ability to free dissedents decrease as a result of Abu Ghraib or stay the same? (I think we can agree it likely hasn't increased.) I don't honestly know the answer (no one does), but this is a potential example of how our losing the moral high ground may end up hurting actual people (though in the future).
Posted by: baltar at March 3, 2005 12:32 PM | PERMALINKBaltar,
I don't seem to remember from my asian history class that China has a political culture embracing individual rights (there was a recent coup about the movie Hero reflecting a collectivist state and culture). I remember at one point there were 500 offenses that would get a death penalty in China, I remember how Chin buried hundreds of academics because they said that history existed before he did, and I remember the mandate of heaven says that the government can pretty much take whatever rights away whenever it wants to, as long as the country doesn't take a drastic turn for the worse. I have to wonder whether a political culture like that could be receptive to what many call human rights, or whether their choice to release certain dissidents might rather be motivated by favored trade status or sharing of technology.
Morris,
As I noted in my reply, we're not sure that the loss of our moral authority means a damn thing. I freely admit that. Of course China may have a polity that rejects Western conceptions of human rights (they may also completely understand human rights, but choose to abuse people anyway because it allows a communist elite to keep power over the masses: you say po-TAY-to, I say po-TAH-to). That doesn't mean that they are idiots. If the world frowns on them for how they are treating a dissident (because the US points it out using our global soapbox), then they may understand that to keep relatively good relations with the rest of the world they need to pretend to care about a person for a while. My argument is that through Abu Ghraib (and other scandals) we are losing our moral position to point fingers at other states. That (I think we can agree) doesn't make our lives easier, but it might (and here is where we disagree) make our lives harder. I can't prove that, but I can point out the logic that underlies my position. You are welcome to reject it.
An additional argument is that since the US has proven (through Abu Ghraib and other scandals) that we really don't care that much about upholding human rights, the rest of the world can ignore us on our global soapbox. In other words, our actions (abuse) speak louder than our words (human rights are good). The end result is that more people around the world end up abused because (in general) the world starts to care less about basic human rights. Can I prove this? No, but it again underscores the logic of what we have given up through our actions.
Posted by: baltar at March 3, 2005 01:43 PM | PERMALINKIsn't the point here though that the interests we are fighting for (supposedly) are moral/idealistic interests and that if we can't match our deeds to our words we're just another China or what have you. Or, put another way, that there's no reason for any other person, group or country to support us in these missions if we're commiting the kinds of atrocities that we are knocking over other government for doing. If the whole point of our foreign policy is to foster changes against this type of thing in Egypt (though apparently not so much in Pakistan or China) ... it's both dangerous and nonsensical to act this way.
And Morris, there's a fair amount of research that holds that "soft" power can be pretty important and significant. If we lose our soft power, if people's around the world no longer aspire to be like us, that makes us weaker.
Posted by: Armand at March 6, 2005 05:08 PM | PERMALINKA corollary to Armand's point, on the normative value of democracy:
It's not that democracy works better, but that it is better.
It's harder, slower, less efficient, complicated, messy, requires a tremendous investment of its participants... and on and on. The superiority (call it moral if you want) of this system often lies in the protections it gives to those who are not in power. So when leading democracies try to "convince" other kinds of systems, the power of persuasion is very important.
Posted by: binky at March 7, 2005 10:04 AM | PERMALINK