June 03, 2007

Is the War Going Well?

Basic counterinsurgency strategy (best discussed about forty years ago in Galula's counterinsurgency bible, written after Galula served in Algeria, and observing France's failing attempts to win in Vietnam) argues that counterinsurgency is fundamentally political. On one side is the government, trying to keep order and reduce violence; on the other are the insurgents, trying to change the government or it's policies. In the middle are the vast majority of actors: the regular people. Insurgents target their attacks at whatever targets (political, commercial, religious, cultural, whatever) that will best show to the mass of people that the government is weak/disorganized/failing. When enough people believe that (through the success of those attacks), the insurgency wins (or, at least, is on the way to winning). The government tries to prevent the insurgency from getting the mass of people to believe this. The entire conflict, while fought with guns and bombs, is inherently political (and fundamentally political).

The insurgents don't actually want to fight the counterinsurgency troops. Fighting other people with guns is difficult and deadly; far better to attack "softer" targets (buildings, politicians, bridges - you'll note that another bridge got blown up in Iraq yesterday for example). Insurgents only attack counterinsurgent forces when (A) they are so clearly winning that they can and want to attack the government directly, or (B) when the counterinsurgency is so effective at preventing the insurgents from attacking "soft" targets that the insurgency must fight back directly.

Thus, this WaPo story today could be seen as some good news:

As U.S. troops push more deeply into Baghdad and its volatile outskirts, Iraqi insurgents are using increasingly sophisticated and lethal means of attack, including bigger roadside bombs that are resulting in greater numbers of American fatalities relative to the number of wounded.

Insurgents are deploying huge, deeply buried munitions set up to protect their territory and mounting complex ambushes that demonstrate their ability to respond rapidly to U.S. tactics. A new counterinsurgency strategy has resulted in decreased civilian deaths in Baghdad but has placed thousands of additional American troops at greater risk in small outposts in the capital and other parts of the country.

"It is very clear that the number of attacks against U.S. forces is up" and that they have grown more effective in Baghdad, especially in recent weeks, said Maj. Gen. James E. Simmons, deputy commander for operations in Iraq. At the same time, he said, attacks on Iraqi security forces have declined slightly, citing figures that compare the period of mid-February to mid-May to the preceding three months. "The attacks are being directed at us and not against other people," he said.

The key phrases in those paragraphs are "to protect their territory" and "attacks are being directed at us and not against other people." For counterinsurgency, those are exactly the responses you want: insurgents that are busy attacking you are not busy attacking the people, and the government has a greater chance of restoring political stability.

The "surge" might actually be working at opening up a window of opportunity. The much more important question, at this point, is whether the Iraqi politicians are able (or capable) of driving through that opening...

Posted by baltar at June 3, 2007 01:51 PM | TrackBack | Posted to International Affairs | Iraq | Military Affairs


Comments

You know that my "favorite graduate student" recently completed a dissertation on insurgency as bargaining. You should check it out...

Posted by: binky at June 3, 2007 03:20 PM | PERMALINK

Well how do you work into your calculation that we are (politically) a target that the insurgents clearly want to hit. I mean to borrow from Buffy we are the Big Bad, right? And hitting us is no doubt quite popular in their communities, whereas focusing on other Iraqis could potentially imperil their position and lead to a backlash against the rebels (as we've seen occur in Algeria and Saudi Arabia, among other places)?

And your last sentence seems the key one to me. If a political deal is not to be had - just what are Americans dying for exactly? I mean I suppose we could open and hold open a window for months (albeit with a huge cost in treasure and blood), but if that doesn't produce a political deal can the Surge really be described as working?

Posted by: Armand at June 3, 2007 03:20 PM | PERMALINK

Armand, I agree completely that my last sentence is the key. Perhaps I was to obscure, but my point was that insurgency is all about (and only about) politics: military clashes (while they make headlines) aren't really the key - the political leanings of the mass of people is what each side is fighting over. If the Iraqi government fails to use this "window" to find solutions to the problems (oil revenue sharing, federalism, etc.), then all the successful application of counterinsurgency strategy will be irrelevant. My point, however, was that the WaPo story (and it's only one, so don't count on the conclusions) suggests that the "surge" might be achieving the breathing room that is the best any military-only strategy can accomplish. As for the idea that our presence is a draw to the insurgents, you are right. But that doesn't detract, I argue, from my central point: if they are trying to blow us up, they aren't trying to blow up a bridge (or mosque, or market, or the Green Zone, etc.).

Binky: I'll talk to you about that.

Posted by: baltar at June 3, 2007 04:38 PM | PERMALINK

Well yeah, but I was trying to get at (but apparently didn't get around to actually typing) was that by providing them with politically popular targets (us), does that strengthen the insurgents some how - or give them more leverage/ help them avoid engaging in more politically costly moves and tactics/ delay changes in the status quo on the ground between the Iraqi factionsthat would increase the likelihood of the sides coming to a settlement ... that kind of thing. Or I guess put more simply - is some stability or lessening of the conflict between the Iraqis themselves likely to bring the two sides together - or is it likely to simply continue the status quo of civil war?

Posted by: Armand at June 3, 2007 05:16 PM | PERMALINK
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